The Edge of Reason by Julian Baggini

Author:Julian Baggini
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780300208238
Publisher: Yale University Press

4. Rational catholicism

I have argued that judgement is required at every level to construct or analyse a rational argument. But to say judgement is required is not a vague way of saying that everything is up for grabs or down to personal inclination. A rational argument must meet certain standards of objectivity. These standards ensure that judgement does not have free rein but plays a very specific role, providing a way to distinguish between arguments that are non-rational, such as those that are based on mystical experience, and those which are rational in form but fail to meet the standards of a good rational argument, such as those for the efficacy of homeopathy.

This account of rationality also explains why it is natural to see logical arguments as the paradigms of rationality. When an argument is set out in explicit logical steps it becomes clearly comprehensible and assessable, which also ensures it is defeasible. And if the premises are correct, that gives an interest-neutral reason to accept the force of the conclusion. But the fact that formal deductive arguments most clearly pass the test for rationality does not mean that no other form of argument does. Deduction does not define rationality, it merely exemplifies its virtues more clearly than is usually possible.

This view of rationality has important consequences for our conception of what reason is. It shows how it is possible to abandon the idea that we can arrive at the truth by appeal to objective facts and logic alone, without necessarily embracing total relativism, since the strong constraints on the requirements for objective rational arguments severely limit the range of possible rational accounts we can give of the world. It suggests that good judgement is much more than just opinion, and something less than the mere following of logical rules.

This conception of rationality might help us to explain some otherwise puzzling features of rational discourse in general, and philosophy in particular. In general terms, we might call this the catholicism of rational discourse. In every department of a typical university, we see rational inquiry. And yet the methods and assumptions of the different disciplines vary enormously. Sometimes, these differences can appear to mark fundamental disagreement about the nature of rationality. Some belligerent scientists, for instance, insist that anything being done in the arts and humanities which is not based on the empirical methods of science is just nonsense.

I think that, on the whole, these divisions are at least in part a product not of a different conception of rationality but of different judgements about what kinds of reasons satisfy the requirements of rationality. So, for instance, a lot of natural scientists think that only empirical scientific data are clear, assessable and interest-neutral enough to provide the basis for a compelling argument. Others would say that there are important questions which cannot be settled by scientific means, and that we ought to look for the strongest reasons to determine the answers to these that we can find. Such disagreements are inevitable, since what counts as an objective reason for belief in the end depends in part on judgement.

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